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The purpose of this thesis is to explore and understand the barriers that hinder the 
Department of Defense (DOD) from implementing a single joint camouflage combat 
uniform for the Armed Forces. Before 2002, the Armed Forces primarily relied on two 
camouflage uniforms: the woodland Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) and Desert 
Camouflage Uniform (DCU). In 2002, the Marine Corps began issuing its Marine pattern 
(MARPAT) camouflage uniforms in woodland and desert colors and the remaining three 
services quickly followed suit, resulting in ten different camouflage uniforms in the past 
15 years. These separate designs cost billions of dollars, duplicate effort, and complicate 
logistics with no discernible effect of better-concealed combatants. The methodology 
applies strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT), and political, economic, 
social, and technological (PEST) analyses; examines the requirements and role of each of 
the Armed Forces; and compares advantages and disadvantages to a single joint 
camouflage uniform. The literature review consists of reports from the Government 
Accountability Office, research results, and additional government-related feedback. The 
findings of this report indicate that implementing a single joint camouflage uniform for 
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A. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and understand the barriers that hinder the 
Department of Defense (DOD) from implementing a single joint camouflage combat 
uniform for the Armed Forces. The Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) restricted the DOD Armed Forces from adopting new camouflage uniforms 
unless all the Services adopted the pattern, in stark contrast with the ten camouflage 
patterns now in use across the services. Prior to 2002, the Armed Forces primarily relied 
on two camouflage uniforms: the woodland and desert Battle Dress Uniforms and Desert 
Camouflage Uniform (BDU, DCU). In 2002, the Marine Corps began issuing its Marine 
pattern (MARPAT) pixelated camouflage uniforms in woodland and desert colors and the 
remaining three services quickly followed suit, resulting in ten different camouflage 
uniforms in the past 15 years. These separate efforts result in cost inefficiencies, 
duplicate efforts, complicate logistics, and do not provide all Service members with the 
same level of effective concealment.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer these questions: 
• What barriers hinder the DOD from implementing a single joint 
camouflage combat uniform? 
• What are the Service histories for the camouflage combat uniform? 
• What are the benefits and drawbacks of implementing a single joint 
camouflage combat uniform? 
• What kind of testing is conducted for camouflage patterns? 
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• What do the PEST (Political, Economic, Social, and Technological) and 
SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analyses provide 
to the development of acquisition strategies? 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
The intended objectives of this research are to explore the history of DOD Service 
component combat uniforms, the recent proliferation of Service-specific uniforms, and 
the barriers and challenges to implementing a single joint camouflage combat uniform 
across the DOD Armed Forces. This research includes a literature review of applicable 
DOD documents to develop an understanding of combat uniform development and 
implementation. The following analytical frameworks, to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of potential barriers, will be used: 
• PEST Analysis—a tool used to help identify the macro-environmental 
influences that can have an impact on an organization and futures 
decisions 
• SWOT Analysis—a methodology used to analyze the internal and external 
factors that would affect the implementation of a single joint camouflage 
uniform for the DOD Armed Forces 
The research and data collected for this essay will aid in formulating a 
comparative analysis. Details from both the SWOT and PEST as well as the literary 
review will provide the reader with a non-biased summary. The concluding results will 
focus on addressing the barriers to implementing a joint camouflage uniform. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORM  
Although the use of camouflage by military forces dates back to the First World 
War, this research will address the history and testing of camouflage patterns since the 
Vietnam era. Most of the emphasis will address the American history, development, and 
testing of camouflage uniforms. A brief synopsis of three other countries’ camouflage 
patterns is included for comparison. Of note is that the primary focus of this research is 
the camouflage patterns; the various uniforms also differ in types of fabrics used and in 
design functionality. 
1. United States 
In 1952 all U.S. Service branches utilized the olive-green utility uniform—itself a 
variation of the World War II uniforms—which saw service in Korea and Vietnam. There 
were few modifications to this uniform, and it remained largely the same until the 80s. In 
1963, however, tropical combat clothing was produced and issued to Soldiers serving in 
Vietnam. The first two patterns were in the olive-green shade 107 in a wind-resistant 
cotton fabric and were much the same, excepting that the second coat covered exposed 
buttons to reduce snagging in tropical terrain. 
In 1967 a third pattern emerged in the form of the Engineer Research and 
Development Lab (ERDL) camouflage pattern. This uniform mixed tan, green, brown, 
and black colors in an effort to blend in with the various shades found in Vietnam. 
Descended from the ERDL was the 1981 adoption of the four-color woodland pattern 
M81 Battle Dress Uniform (BDU), the leading field uniform of the DOD’s Armed 
Services (Brayley, 2009, p. 86). The BDU changed the uniform design and appearance 
with a different fabric, placement of pockets, and the camouflage pattern. All branches of 
the DOD wore these uniforms until 2002 and the patterns on these uniforms are displayed 
in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  1960–1981 U.S. Armed Forces woodland camouflage patterns. 
Adapted from “USA” (n.d.). 
The Desert Camouflage Uniform (DCU) was introduced at the same time as the 
woodland pattern BDU, but was issued only to Special Operations troops in the Middle 
East. The DCU was virtually identical to the BDU except for the tan, brown, and black 
colored pattern called “chocolate chip” by Service members. A new, three color DCU 
was issued in 1991 and stayed in use during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom until 2006. These camouflage patterns are displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  U.S. Armed Forces arid camouflage patterns. 
Adapted from “USA” (n.d.). 
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2. Other Countries 
a. Germany 
Although Germany was one of the leading innovators of camouflage in WWII, 
there was not much effort made at camouflage pattern uniforms until the German Army 
Uniform trials of 1976. These trials produced the Sagezahnmuster (saw tooth), 
Punktmuster (dot pattern), and three Flecktarn (spot pattern) designs. The Flecktarn 
patterns were labeled A (small spots), B (large spots), and C (shadow). The Flecktarn B 
(Figure 3) pattern was determined to be the best of the six and was adopted into the 
German Army in the mid-1980s and called Flecktarnmuster, which was produced in 
tropical and desert colorations. Many experts regard German Flecktarn as among the best 
in the world (Brayley, p. 43, 2009), and the Germans still use these patterns. 
 
Figure 3.  German Flecktarn pattern. Adapted from “Germany” (n.d.). 
b. Britain 
The standard uniform of the British Army until 1966 was khaki, which has a long 
history with British forces. At this point, Britain introduced the Disruptive Pattern 
Material (DPM) design, which used several earth-tone colors in a splotchy pattern, 
similar to the ERDL woodland uniform in use by U.S. forces (Brayley, p. 86 2009). The 
original DPM pattern was designated the P60, issued in 1966, and based on the previous 
khaki uniform design. The P60 was replaced with the P68, and then the P84, which 
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remained in service for the next ten years. The next significant change was the Soldier 95 
uniform, introduced in 1995, which utilized lessons learned in the Falklands by making 
the uniform ensemble modular. The newest camouflage uniform to replace the Soldier 95 
is the Multi Terrain Pattern (MTP), introduced in 2010 and based heavily on the 
American-made Crye Precision LLC MultiCam© pattern with DPM influences (Brayley, 
p. 45, 2009). The P68 pattern and the newer MTP are illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  British camouflage patterns. Adapted from 
“United Kingdom” (n.d.). 
c. Canada 
The Canadian Armed Forces have an interesting history with camouflage 
uniforms since the Vietnam era. From the 1950s until 1996, the standard combat uniform 
was solid olive green, with a tan-colored version for arid environments. There were 
several camouflage-patterned DPM smocks and jackets issued from the 1970s, but these 
were intended only for garrison use (Brayley, 2009. p. 26). For deployments and field 
exercises, the olive-green uniform was used. Then, in 1996, the Canadian Disruptive 
Pattern (CADPAT) uniform was issued, and it remains as the standard combat uniform 
for the Canadian Armed Forces. There are two other versions in use, the CADPAT Arid 
Region (AR) and the Winter/Arctic (WA), shown in Figure 5. The CADPAT was one of 
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the first pixelated patterns used, and it greatly influenced branches of the U.S. Armed 
Forces (Cramer, n.d.). 
 
Figure 5.  Canadian temperate and arid camouflage patterns. 
Adapted from “Canada” (n.d.). 
B. U.S. DOD BRANCH HISTORY 
The U.S. military branches individually pursued camouflage uniform 
development beginning in the late 1990s. The USMC was interested in camouflage 
patterns that were potentially more effective than the existing BDU and DCU and that 
would provide them with a distinct appearance (Brown, 2013). The USA, USAF, and the 
USN followed suit; all four branches met with varying levels of success. The 
Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) report to Congress in report number 12–707 
depicts that none of the Services collaborated with another in camouflage uniform 
development (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2015). Figure 6 depicts the 
timeline of DOD uniform introduction. 
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Figure 6.  Timeline of DOD camouflage uniform introductions. 
Adapted from Fahrenthold (2013). 
1. USMC 
The Marines, like all branches, wore the woodland pattern BDU and desert 
pattern DCU since the early 1980s. Following the success of Canada’s CADPAT 
introduction in the late 90s, the USMC, with Canada’s permission, began evaluating the 
disruptive pattern in order to develop the unique Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform 
(MCCUU). Refinements of the CADPAT pattern were assessed against eight other 
patterns during testing at the USMC Scout Sniper Instructor School. The CADPAT 
derivative, called MARPAT (for Marine Pattern, displayed in Figure 6), was selected in 
both woodland and desert variations in 2002 and became the U.S. military’s first uniform 
with a digital camouflage pattern (Brayley, 2002 p. 88). The MCCUU design differs from 
the BDU by removing the lower front bellow-type pockets, changing the upper chest 
pockets by slanting them and adding Velcro closures, and the fabric is a fire-resistant 
nylon blend; these changes were implemented to add utility, comfort, and protection 
while wearing body armor. The USMC uses a single, coyote brown color for 
Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE) that complements both 
variations and reduced production costs. It is worth noting that the USMC have patented 
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their design and embedded a small Eagle, Globe, and Anchor (EGA) emblem to the 
pattern every few feet (Brown, 2013) to discourage other branches from using the design. 
2.  USA  
In 2004, following the Marines’ example, the Army adopted nearly the same 
digital pattern (using different colors) into the Universal Camouflage Pattern (UCP). The 
intent was to design a single combat uniform ensemble capable of performing in any 
environment, reducing the need to issue specialized camouflage clothing for deployments 
to different geographical areas. Adopting the UCP pattern was only one change in 
creating the Army Combat Uniform (ACU); the design of this uniform was completely 
new and added slanted breast pockets, vertical shoulder and lower-leg pockets, and 
Velcro closures all around. Initial testing reported in TR09/021L (2009) concluded that 
UCP provided the best average performance of 10 other patterns across three areas—
desert, woodland, and urban—but did not test as well as environment-specific patterns in 
their intended environment (U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center [NSRDEC], 2009). 
Sydney Freedberg (2012) asserts that Soldiers deployed to Afghanistan soon 
discovered that the UCP not only failed to blend in with the terrain but the pale, green 
colors were somewhat noticeable in most areas of the region. Indeed, as both Brayley 
(2009, p. 7) and the Army’s FM 21–75 Combat Skills of the Soldier (1984) point out, no 
single camouflage pattern will be suitable for all environments. Brayley (p. 12) further 
contends that the cost savings from the Army’s sole pattern perhaps outweighed the 
reduced effectiveness of individual concealment. Army leadership would have to 
carefully weigh the cost savings against the possible detection of Soldiers on the 
battlefield.   
In 2009, Congress directed the DOD to take immediate action to provide Soldiers 
with a camouflage pattern suitable for that environment (GAO, 2015). The Army 
responded, and in 2010 concluded that UCP failed to meet concealment needs for the 
multiple regions in Afghanistan. The Camouflage Improvement Effort began with the 
objective to find a replacement uniform suitable for operational environments. The 
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testing was a phased approach with the immediate objective of Phases I-III to determine 
the best short-term solution (Hepfinger et al., 2010). Two contenders were evaluated: 
Crye Manufacturing’s MultiCam© pattern, which was in use by Special Forces at the 
time, and the UCP-D, which was a variant of UCP with darker colors (illustrated in 
Figure 7). Evaluations from Phase II resulted in the selection and implementation of 
MultiCam© in Phase III. This pattern was named the Operational Enduring Freedom 
Camouflage Pattern (OEF-CP). The OEF-CP was issued to Soldiers deploying to 
Afghanistan on the Flame-Resistant Army Combat Uniform (FRACU), a uniform the 
same functionality as the ACU but made from a flame-resistant mix of fabrics as opposed 
to the ACU made from a 50–50 nylon cotton fabric mix.  
 
Figure 7.  Comparison of UCP and UCP-D. Adapted from 
Venezia and Peloquin (n.d.). 
Phase IV’s goal was to determine a uniform decision for a long-term, multi-
environment camouflage pattern. The objective was to develop a three-pattern family 
(woodland, arid, and transitional) with a single pattern for OCIE. Selection of patterns 
began in 2011 with 22 entrants being reduced to four families of patterns for additional 
evaluation in the next stage. The testing in this portion indicated that all of the tested 
patterns performed similarly to the OEF-CP in their intended environments (Cole & 
Sloane, 2010). 
 11 
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2014 (NDAA, 2014), however, 
banned funding for development and fielding of any new camouflage patterns unless it 
was for all Services to use (H.R. 3304, 2013). The NDAA stipulations ruled out the 
previous four vendor patterns, so the Army began investigating the possibility of using 
OEF CP as the transitional pattern and using existing patterns from the other Services as 
woodland and arid variations. Author John Mazz (2015) reported that licensing fees for 
the use of MultiCam© caused the Army to choose a similar pattern called Scorpion W2 
as its replacement for the UCP, and named it the Operational Camouflage Pattern (OCP) 
to emphasize that its reach extended beyond Afghanistan. The Scorpion W2 pattern can 
be traced to 2002 when Crye Precision LLC, under contract with the U.S. Army Natick 
Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center created the original version as 
part of the Future Force Warrior (FFW) program of 2002 (Cox, 2015).  
3. USAF 
In 2006, the USAF elected to join the USMC and the USA by selecting its own 
unique uniform design in a digitized tiger stripe pattern. The first pattern was colored 
blue and was eventually discontinued and replaced with the same pattern in colors found 
in the UCP. The USAF uniform was dubbed the Airman’s Battle Uniform (ABU) and it 
suffered from the same inadequacy of blending with terrain found in operational areas as 
the UCP. Airmen also complained of the heavy weight of the material, which led to the 
2012 release of the Improved Airman Battle Uniform with a lighter-weight 50/50 cotton-
nylon blend. Still, USAF leaders determined that the ABU was not suitable for operations 
in Afghanistan and subsequently directed Airmen in that theater would wear the Army’s 
FRACU in OEF-CP. Testing data from the USAF was not available at the time of this 
writing (GAO , 2010). 
4. USN 
The Navy Working Uniform (NWU) was the result of a fleet-wide survey 
conducted in 2003 and again in 2005. There were four final patterns in digital and 
woodland camouflage, with the dominant blue color in a MARPAT pattern being 
selected and named the Navy Working Uniform (NWU) Type I (Brown, 2013). Sailors 
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affectionately call this uniform “blueberries” or “aquaflage” due to being the same color 
as ships and the seas in which they operate. The NWU Type I was designed in a four-
color, 50–50 nylon-cotton twill fabric; it was not designed to disguise Sailors against the 
backdrop of a ship and was never intended for a tactical setting. Brayley adds that the 
NWU Type I replaced seven previous uniforms issued to Sailors (p. 90, 2009). However, 
the colors of the uniform do not blend with the surroundings in an operational 
environment, so the NWU Type II (also known as AOR 1 for Area of Responsibility) 
tactical uniform was created for USN Special Operations personnel. This pattern is 
slightly darker overall than the desert MARPAT with different color shades; it is made of 
the same 50–50 nylon-cotton twill fabric. In August of 2016, the Navy announced that it 
is replacing the NWU Type I with the NWU Type III (also known as AOR 2) uniforms, 
which are colored with more browns than the woodland MARPAT. The objective of 
designing a single working uniform for wear aboard ship and when ashore was not met 
by the Type I uniform. The NWU also bears the Navy Anchor, Constitution, and Eagle 
(ACE) symbol embedded in the pattern, much like the Marines’ EGA on the MARPAT 
(Blakemore, 2016). The total cost of all branch’s efforts are represented in Table 1.  
Table 1.   Ground combat uniform costs. Adapted from GAO (2010). 
 
 
C. CAMOUFLAGE PATTERN TESTING  
The Army Combat Uniform (ACU) development began in 2003 with the intent to 
provide Soldiers with an improved uniform capable of providing effective camouflage in 
all environments. The Universal Camouflage Pattern (UCP) was selected, but Army 
officials failed to make available to Congress any testing and evaluation data that 
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supported this decision. Furthermore, no performance reports nor explanations were 
provided regarding the development of the UCP (GAO, 2012, p. 17–18). 
Thus, the focus of this section will primarily rely on the U.S. Army’s camouflage 
pattern testing conducted by the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and 
Engineering Center (NSRDEC) from March 2007 through March 2009 and during the 
Phase IV portion of the Camouflage Improvement Effort. These evaluations contained an 
incredible amount of data on camouflage pattern effectiveness. Most of the information 
has been gleaned from the Natick Technical Report TR-09/021L and the Army Materiel 
Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) Technical Report TR-2015-19 respectively. Both 
of these reports focused on camouflage patterns and their effectiveness in varying 
environments rather than uniform design and are further described in the Literature 
Review section of this paper. 
The Photosimulation Camouflage Detection Test, detailed in TR-09/021L, was 
conducted between March 2007 through March 2009 in order to test the effectiveness of 
the UCP-D and the MultiCam© pattern used by Special Forces in Afghanistan against 
UCP. UCP was proving ineffective in the various terrain found there and an alternative 
was needed. 
Phase IV of the Army’s Camouflage Uniform Improvement Effort, detailed in 
TR-2015-19, was conducted from 2011–2014 to determine the Army’s long-term strategy 
for its uniform requirements for the future. A U.S. Army Corps of Engineers study found 
that the Army’s operating environment consisted of 19% arid, 37% woodland, and 44% 
transitional environments (Mortlock, 2017). The objective was to determine which 
patterns worked best in these environments in order to find a three-pattern family of 
camouflage patterns to augment operational reach around the globe.  
The NSRDEC test, performed from 2007–2009, was conducted to quantify the 
effectiveness of varied camouflage patterns in different environments (NSRDEC, 2009). 
NSRDEC, in conjunction with the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Test Center, developed a 
computerized photo simulation evaluation for testing camouflage effectiveness shown in 
Figure 8. This method uses photographs of subjects wearing various camouflage 
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uniforms in varying terrain under relatively similar conditions, and it allows field data to 
be taken to observers rather than the costly method of putting observers in the field.  
 
Figure 8.  Photosimulation observer test setup. Adapted from 
NSRDEC (2009). 
Eighteen camouflage patterns worn by test personnel in various terrains were 
evaluated through obtaining visual ranges of detection by over 900 observers (NSRDEC, 
2009) to determine which patterns performed well in different environments. Three 
environments were of interest; desert, urban, and woodland. Each environment was 
imaged in various CONUS locations and contained three scenes at multiple ranges 
illustrated in Table 2: 
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Table 2.   Photosimulation detection test environmental parameters. 
Adapted from NSRDEC (2009). 
 
 
Camouflage patterns included Universal Camouflage Pattern (UCP), woodland 
and desert MARPAT, MultiCam©, and patterns from other countries. Five of the patterns 
were eliminated from the final analysis due to availability or poor performance 
(NSRDEC, 2009). Final rankings by scene are displayed in Table 3; it is noteworthy that 
some patterns that ranked highly in one setting did not perform as well in other scenes 
within that environment. 
 16 
Table 3.   Ranking of patterns by scene. Adapted from NSRDEC (2009). 
 
 
The ranking of patterns by scene highlight the poor performance of UCP in desert 
and woodland settings; indeed, the only scenes that UCP ranked tolerably were in two of 
the Urban settings. Both MARPAT patterns ranked highly in their respective 
backgrounds and the OEF-CP pattern outperformed UCP in every scene except Urban 
Small Building. This testing confirmed the Army’s desire to find a replacement 
camouflage pattern for UCP. 
Expanding from specific scenes into overall backgrounds reveals similar results as 
the data were averaged from the three scenes within the environment. Table 3 illustrates 
ranking of patterns by the environment, which primarily generates a general overview 
rather than the scene-specific rating as depicted in Table 4. 
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As Table 4 illustrates, environment-specific patterns performed well in their 
intended environments and fared poorly in other environments. Several patterns ranked 
significantly higher than UCP, including OEF-CP and MARPAT. 
Testing for the Army’s Camouflage Uniform Improvement Project Phase IV 
began in 2011 and used similar methodologies. The purpose of this phase was to 
determine the Army’s long-term, three-pattern family of uniforms using a single 
Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE) pattern. Testing primarily 
relied on photosimulation detection and operational testing, with nearly 200 observers 
evaluating the former and 120 for the latter. Eighteen camouflage pattern families were 
evaluated for Stage 1 and four families were tested further in Stage 2. Provisions in the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2014 (H.R. 3304, 2013) prohibited 
funding for new patterns, which ruled out the four patterns tested in Stage 2 (NSRDEC, 
2009). To comply with the provisions, the Product Manager - Soldier Clothing and 
Individual Equipment (PdM-SCIE) investigated using the alternative Scorpion W2 (now 
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called the Operational Camouflage Pattern, or OCP) as a transitional pattern and existing 
DOD patterns for arid and woodland environments. The following uniforms were tested: 
• OCP: Operational Camouflage Pattern (Scorpion W2) 
• MPD: Marine Corps Pattern - Desert 
• MPW: Marine Corps Pattern—Woodland 
• NPW: Navy Pattern—Woodland 
• DCU: Desert Camouflage Uniform 
• BDU: Battle Dress Uniform 
There are three suffixes concerning the use of Organizational Clothing and 
Individual Equipment (OCIE) with the above patterns: 
• O: OCP OCIE (OCP camouflage pattern) 
• C: Coyote OCIE (USMC and USN solid color) 
• N: No OCIE worn 
As noted in the report, OCP is a transitional pattern, MPD and DCU are arid 
patterns, and MPW, BDU, and NPW are woodland patterns. The eight uniform/OCIE 
configurations are shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  Army Camouflage Uniform Improvement Project, Phase IV uniform 
configuration. Source: Mazz (2015). 
The evaluations did not focus on Coyote OCIE, but data results have caused the 
Army to reconsider the affordability constraint that mandated a single OCIE pattern. The 
DLA Troop Support Clothing and Textiles Supply Chain report a cost of approximately 
$4,000 in OCIE expenses per Soldier (Berteau, 2011). The evaluation shows that the 
performance of the DCU-N is significantly better than the DCU-O for example.  
The results of the arid pattern assessment in the arid environment are clear. Arid 
camouflage patterns with OCP OCIE (MPD-O and DCU-O) perform significantly better 
than OCP-O. There are indications that, with matching OCIE, the arid patterns could 
substantially better their performance. MPD-O and DCU-O perform equally well (Mazz, 
2015, p. 18). 
The results of the woodland pattern assessment in the woodland environment are 
mixed. Woodland camouflage pattern with OCP OCIE (MPW-O and BDU-O) perform 
significantly better than OCP-O in sunlit, dormant conditions but not in sunlit, verdant 
(green or covered in green vegetation) conditions. Under woodland twilight verdant 
conditions, the woodland patterns perform significantly better the OCP-O. 
D. SUMMARY 
Prior to 2002, all four military branches of the U.S. were utilizing the BDU and 
DCU. Since then, each Service branch has developed new camouflage uniforms specific 
to that branch. However, the DOD Services employed a fragmented approach in 
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designing, developing, and implementing these uniforms. Collaboration between the 
Services was ignored due to uniform development efforts being implemented 
individually. 
The GAO, in report 12–707, found that only one Service followed the DOD’s 
acquisition guidance found in the 5000-Series (GAO, 2012). The USMC complied with 
specific, required reports and information documentation to support its decision-making 
in five distinct categories: acquisition strategy, acquisition program baseline, risk 
assessment, cost estimate for the program’s life cycle, and a test and evaluation master 
plan. Comprehensive testing was performed that narrowed the original pool of more than 
60 patterns down to eight, then to three.  
The Army failed to follow the 5000-Series guidance nor did they use an 
acquisition strategy that would have provided a blueprint for research and development, 
testing, and fielding (GAO, 2012). The selection of the UCP was not supported with 
information on the results of testing, performance evaluations, or risks to the program. 
The pattern also proved to be ineffective in Afghanistan and non-urban areas in Iraq, 
prompting Congress to direct the Army to provide suitable camouflage uniforms to 
deployed Soldiers immediately (GAO, 2012). 
The Air Force, like the Army, was lacking an acquisition strategy in selecting the 
ABU. The GAO concludes that Air Force testing processes were incomplete as they 
failed to test different patterns and fabrics before choosing the tiger stripe pattern. USAF 
officials argued that ABU development was intended only for use on bases and, as such, 
did not fall under acquisition guidance provided in the 5000-Series (GAO, 2012).  
The USN uniform development efforts are not included in GAO Report 12–707 
due to the Navy adopting uniforms developed within their Special Warfare Command. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PURPOSE 
These reports are presented in chronological order to provide the reader a sound 
understanding of the DOD camouflage uniform development since 2007. By this time, 
the USMC had developed and introduced the MARPAT in two color schemes, and the 
USA was undergoing Congressional scrutiny of the ACU and FRACU with UCP. 
Furthermore, these reports focus on camouflage pattern effectiveness rather than uniform 
design and material. 
The first report, issued by the U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center and 
labeled TR-09/021L (NSRDEC, 2009), describes and documents in detail the technical 
methodology and results from photosimulation evaluations of various camouflage 
patterns across multiple environments. Overall, there were over 90,000 data points 
collected using 39 different backgrounds from several locations: the Cassidy MOUT site 
at Ft. Campbell, KY; Ft. Irwin, CA; and Devens, MA. Camouflage patterns included 
UCP, Desert Brush, Desert MARPAT, MultiCam©, and Syria. These patterns are 
displayed in Table 5. 




The four latter patterns demonstrated a significant visual detection performance 
advantage over the UCP in most environments. The report concludes with several 
recommendations, such as pattern color and brightness are more important than design; 
environment-specific patterns provide the most effective camouflage in their respective 
environments; and defined requirements are necessary for the DOD to successfully 
implement any future camouflage patterns (NSRDEC, 2009).  
The next report, GAO-10-669R (GAO, 2010), evaluates the DOD’s combat 
uniforms utilized by the Armed Forces by assessing four specific objectives, 
methodologies used, and the findings. Objective 1 assessed the extent of performance 
standards by which camouflage uniforms were judged.  
The GAO found that, although the Services have performance criteria, 
camouflage effectiveness is not among them. The focus of Objective 2 was to determine 
the costs and logistics requirements of developing and implementing Service-specific 
uniforms. The authors present a graph representing design and development costs in 
Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.  DOD uniform design and development costs. Source: GAO (2010). 
Exact figures from the report are displayed in Table 6: 
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Table 6.   Camouflage uniform costs across the DOD. Source: GAO (2010). 
 
 
Additionally, this report finds that production costs have increased from $223 
million in FY05 to $422 million in FY09. Furthermore, DOD officials claim that fielding 
multiple uniforms in a combat theater does not require additional logistics support; this 
additional support, however, is displaced to U.S. based storage costs (GAO, 2010). 
Objective 3 evaluated the impact of patents on sharing uniform design across the 
Services. The authors determined that government-owned patents do not present a barrier 
to allowing other Services to adopt the same camouflage pattern. Lastly, Objective 4 
assessed any risks or challenges to Service members operating in tactical environments 
where separate camouflage uniforms are used. The authors report that no data has been 
collected by the DOD that would enable such an assessment (GAO, 2010). 
GAO Report 12–707 (GAO, 2012) addresses the DOD’s fragmented approach to 
uniform development. The report also identifies two elements that are fundamental for 
producing successful outcomes in acquisitions: using clear policies and procedures that 
are consistently implemented; and obtaining effective, reliable information to make 
decisions (GAO, 2012). This report determined that the USMC was the only branch to 
follow these elements, and thereby developed a uniform that met its requirements. Field 
testing of the MCCUU involved almost 300 Marines from Expeditionary Forces over 22 
days evaluating fit and comfort, durability, appearance, and mission suitability (GAO, 
2012). The USA and USAF did not follow these essential elements; the report found that 
both Services developed uniforms that did not meet mission requirements and 
subsequently had to be replaced. Test and evaluation results for both the UCP and the 
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ABU were not made available. The report concludes that although the DOD provided 
acquisition guidance through the 5000-Series policies, all Services did not follow said 
guidance. The GAO report recommended that the Secretary of Defense take action in 
four areas: ensure that the military Services have and use clear policies and a knowledge-
based approach in acquisitions, develop and issue joint criteria for uniforms, develop a 
policy to ensure that uniforms provide equivalent levels of protection and performance, 
and to take advantage of pursuing partnerships for the joint development and 
implementation of uniforms (GAO, 2012). 
GAO report 13–279SP (GAO, 2013) addresses fragmentation and duplication 
within the DOD. In this report to Congress, the GAO points out programs and activities 
within the DOD that are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative that, if addressed, could 
reduce the cost of government operations. The report is divided into two categories: 
Section I presents 17 areas that apply to the former, and Section II summarizes 14 
additional opportunities for the latter. Section I addresses combat uniforms and the 
DOD’s fragmented and costly approach in their development and acquisition processes. 
This GAO report determined that the military Services and the DOD have not 
collaborated in setting criteria for the uniforms and that the DOD has failed to take steps 
to ensure equivalent protection and performance levels for combat uniforms, potentially 
exposing our Service members to increased risk. This fragmented approach resulted in 
numerous inventories of uniforms and an increased cost to the logistics chain. Lastly, the 
report recommends that the Secretary of Defense should direct the following three 
actions: identify and implement steps to develop and issue joint criteria for uniforms, 
develop a policy to ensure future uniforms provide equivalent levels of protection and 
performance, and that the military departments shall actively pursue partnerships to 
minimize fragmentation, reduce inventory, and reduce overall procurement costs (GAO, 
2013). 
The last report analyzed is from the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity 
(AMSAA) evaluation of the U.S. Army’s Camouflage Uniform Improvement Project, 
Phase IV. In this technical report, labeled TR-2015-19, author John Mazz (2015) begins 
with an overview of Phase IV testing. The objective of this phase is to determine a long-
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range camouflage uniform strategy for the Army’s future needs. A family of three 
patterns (woodland, transitional, and arid) with an Organizational Clothing and Individual 
Equipment (OCIE) pattern was desired by the USA. In 2014, the Army selected the 
Scorpion W2 pattern as the OCP transitional pattern for uniforms and OCIE. The author 
continues by describing the design of the study and providing analysis from 
photosimulation and operational testing of woodland and arid patterns in their respective 
backgrounds. Figure 11 illustrates an image sequence for the photosimulation detection 
analysis while Figure 12 represents depiction of a blending study. 
 
Figure 11.  Depiction of image sequence. Adapted from Mazz (2009). 
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Figure 12.  Depiction of a blending analysis. Adapted from Mazz (2009). 
Mazz concludes that the arid patterns perform far better than the OCP in both day 
and night arid environments and the woodland camouflage patterns perform significantly 
better than the OCP in specific woodland environments, thus supporting the Army’s 
desire for a family of uniforms.   
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The following data analysis will use a PEST (Political, Economic, Social, 
Technological) and SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) framework 
to examine external and internal factors affecting camouflage uniform development 
within the DOD. This section of the thesis will focus on two propositions: maintaining 
the current status quo of service-specific camouflage uniforms, and implementing a 
single joint camouflage combat uniform across all branches. 
A. PEST ANALYSIS 
The PEST analysis provides a tool to evaluate the macro-environmental (external) 
factors of a business or organization (Shapiro, 2013). In the following PEST analysis, 
each factor will examine benefits and drawbacks of implementing a joint camouflage 
uniform in order to allow a better understanding of each dimension. Common PEST 
analysis factors are found in Table 7. Each factor will evaluate the benefits and 
drawbacks of the options of Service-specific uniforms and joint camouflage uniforms. 
Table 7.   Factors of the PEST analysis. Adapted from Shapiro (2013). 
 
 
1. Political Factors 
These factors relate to how the government intervenes with an activity and to 
what degree. Political factors include: 




• Fiscal policy 
• Legislation 
Since the military Service branches belong to the DOD—itself a branch of the 
U.S. Government—political factors cannot be ignored. Congress dramatically influences 
decisions made by the DOD as evidenced by the provisions in the NDAA 2014. Section 
352 of H.R. 3304, Public Law 113–66 quotes: 
It is the policy of the United States that the Secretary of Defense shall take 
steps to reduce the separate development and fielding of service-specific 
combat and camouflage utility uniforms, in order to collectively adopt and 
field the same combat and camouflage utility uniforms for use by all 
members of the Armed Forces to the maximum extent practicable (H.R. 
3304, 2013). 
As of the time of this writing, the NDAA 2015 has not stricken this requirement. 
Of note is that the DOD does not have a single office for uniform procurement; this has 
traditionally been Service-driven. There is, however, a Joint Clothing and Textile 
Governance Board (JCTGB) that may share some of this burden (Senate Bill 2943, 
2016). 
The NDAA requirement will affect the Secretary of Defense, the three Service 
Secretaries, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. At least one of the Service chiefs, 
Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, has spoken in favor of this requirement. Author Paul 
Shinkman (2013) quotes Mabus saying “The notion that we [have] all [this] camouflage 
doesn’t make a lot of sense to me,” he also states “It’s worthwhile to see if we can shrink 
the numbers. Whether you go to one, or two or three, that’s still progress” (Shinkman, 
2013). However, it may be unreasonable to expect political leaders to agree with this 
stance. Some may favor the distinctive look that Service-specific uniforms provide, 
regardless of effectiveness. 
The current array of Service-specific uniforms results in a higher number of 
uniform production contracts than a single uniform might entail. Reversing this trend of 
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unique uniforms for every branch to a joint camouflage combat uniform for use by all 
Services may result in an unfavorable impact on commercial providers. Politicians 
represent these businesses and may resist this change in commerce. 
2. Economic Factors 
Economic factors have a significant impact on how an organization does business. 
Factors of this category include: 
• Fiscal responsibility 
• Additional logistics requirements vs. reduced inventory costs 
• Possible reduction in commercial providers 
• Business cycle 
• Labor costs 
• Industry factors 
Fiscal responsibility is owed to the taxpayers, and the military branches should 
not be excused from this. The previously referenced GAO-10-669R report concludes that 
the total of Service-specific uniform design and development cost exceed $18 million; 
production and procurement cost is approximately $1.7 billion (GAO, 2010). 
These are funds that have already been expended and, some might say, is a reason 
to stay with Service-specific uniforms. However, the cost in additional logistics 
requirements for the variety of uniforms now in service has increased and will be a 
continuing expenditure. Moving to a joint uniform would reduce inventory costs in the 
supply chain and should ease logistics requirements by cutting the additional storage 
costs incurred from Service-specific uniforms. However, this potential change in 
commercial providers could limit competition and cause some businesses financial 
distress. Moreover, there may be additional costs incurred from modifying or terminating 
existing contracts. 
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3. Social Factors 
Social factors involve areas that contain the beliefs and attitudes of a population—
in our case, the Service members of the military. Factors in this case are: 
• Distinct appearance of uniforms 
• Shifting military culture to inclusiveness 
• Unequal camouflage effectiveness 
The current array of Service-specific uniforms has resulted in a distinctive look 
for each branch, and some Service members—as well as top officials—want to maintain 
their unique uniforms to distinguish themselves from other branches (Seck, 2013). Seck 
quotes the Commandant of the Marine Corps as saying that the Marines are “sticking 
with the MARPAT like a hobo on a ham sandwich.” The same article quotes the Sergeant 
Major of the Marine Corps (SMMC) Michael Barrett saying that the MCCUU “is a 
visible indicator of our identity as United States Marines” (Seck, 2013). These distinctive 
uniforms may also serve as an enticement to potential recruits that wish to serve their 
country with an additional measure of uniqueness found in Service-specific uniforms.  
Service-specific uniform individuality, however, is at odds with the changing 
military paradigm of exclusive elitism to an inclusive whole. Recent legislation that 
allows females to serve in traditionally male combat roles and homosexuals to serve 
openly in the military are both indicators that the military is shifting to an inclusive, “all 
are welcome” stance. The following quote is an excerpt from USAF LTC Dunivan’s Air 
War College thesis: 
If America expects its military to reflect society, it is imperative that the military 
adopts an inclusionary paradigm of culture. The success or failure of a paradigm shift 
rests with the military. Together its leaders and members are the catalysts for permanent 
social change—they are the paradigm pioneers who can institutionalize a cultural 
paradigm characterized by an inclusive whole rather than a paradigm personified by an 
exclusive few (Dunivin, 1997).  
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Furthermore, there is an ethical aspect to Service-specific uniform design. The 
SMMC has said that the USMC has the best camouflage pattern in the world (Seck, 
2013), and this infers that the other branch’s patterns are somewhat deficient in 
camouflage effectiveness. If our military Service members are all on the same team, in 
the same battle space, then logic dictates that our Service members should wear the same 
uniform with the same level of concealment.  
4. Technological 
Technology changes constantly and considerably influence the way an 
organization functions. Technological factors include: 
• Uniform performance 
• Impact on development and testing 
• Emerging technology 
• Research and development efforts 
• Awareness 
The technology that goes into camouflage uniform development consists of 
patterns, colors, visibility in the visible, Near Infrared (NIR), and Short-Wave Infrared 
(SWIR) spectrums, durability, and insect and flame resistance. Continuing advances in 
technology could yield improved concealment and protection for Service members.  
Additionally, technology has accorded alternative methods of testing camouflage 
effectiveness, such as producing high-quality digital images of various patterns in 
different backgrounds under relatively controlled environments. Observers are then able 
to evaluate uniforms at computer terminals. This method of testing is much less 
expensive and time-consuming than traditional methods of bringing observers into the 
field (NSRDEC, 2009). 
Extensive camouflage pattern testing has been carried out by the Army in the 
recent Camouflage Improvement Effort, one of the most intensive studies ever 
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undertaken in the field of camouflage effectiveness (Vergun, 2014). Data were collected 
and evaluated on existing and experimental patterns—as well as those in use by different 
nations—in 46 daylight conditions and 18 nighttime background types (Mazz, 2015).  
Continuing improvements in research and development are made possible by 
technological advancements. For example, NSRDEC reports advances in fiber science 
resulting in enhanced strength and flame resistance as well as being environmentally-
friendly and sustainable (Lafontaine, 2016). Technology can advance exponentially; it 
would be immensely beneficial to increase awareness of these advances for future use. 
B. SWOT ANALYSIS 
SWOT is an acronym that stands for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats (Renault, 2017). A SWOT analysis is a framework that allows an organization to 
develop a full awareness of factors involved in strategic planning and decision-making. 
The following SWOT analysis is made using the findings of the previously addressed 
PEST analysis and will focus on the proposition to introduce a joint camouflage uniform 
across all branches. Table 8 notes the factors of the SWOT analysis.  
Table 8.   SWOT analysis. Adapted from Renault (2017). 
 
 
1. Strengths  
These factors are internal to the organization and consist of knowledge, 
experiences, and resources—human, physical, and financial—available. As they pertain 
to this paper, the strength factors are: 
• All branches report to the Secretary of Defense 
• Extensive test data gathered 
• The proven effectiveness of some patterns  
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A primary advantage within the Armed Forces is that all branches fall under the 
purview of the Secretary of Defense. Any policy implemented at this level should be 
followed by all Services. A structured hierarchy is typically a practical avenue for policy 
execution.  
There has been extensive testing conducted on the effectiveness of various 
camouflage uniforms, enough to determine what patterns and colors work best in 
woodland, transitional, and arid environments. The USMC developed, tested, and fielded 
an effective pair of woodland and arid uniforms by following DOD guidance. The USA 
took a longer, more expensive route and, after following NDAA 2014 guidance, 
produced an effective transitional pattern. The U.S. Military has an extensive amount of 
knowledge, experience, and data available in camouflage pattern effectiveness that 
should present enough information to make decisions regarding uniform implementation.  
The effects of the various Service-specific camouflage patterns on core branch 
activities is difficult to assess. The MARPAT MCCUU has proven effective in joint 
battle spaces, as has the Army’s OEF-CP and OCP in Afghanistan. The USN NWU Type 
1 and the Air Force’s ABU were not suitable for joint battle spaces; the effects of these 
uniforms in service-specific environments has not been published to date. 
2. Weaknesses 
Weaknesses are also internal to the organization and consist of many of the same 
factors listed under strengths, with a few additions below: 
• Distinct uniforms could be a source of pride 
• Funds previously expended on development 
• Possible effects within the commercial uniform industry  
• Military branches emphasize uniqueness rather than effectiveness 
• Not all branches followed DOD acquisition guidance 
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 However, weaknesses place limitations and restrictions on the objective. If the 
aim is to implement a joint camouflage uniform, then the status quo of Service-specific 
uniforms must be changed. There appears to be a degree of individualism perceived by 
each branch wearing its own uniform, which may be difficult to overcome. The 
Economist (E.B., 2014) quotes Timothy O’Neill, a retired LTC and expert in camouflage, 
as saying “Objectively speaking, it would be better for everyone to wear the same 
uniforms. But the Marines don’t want to look like the Army, the Army doesn’t want to 
look like Marines, and no one wants to look like the Navy” (E.B., 2014). 
An additional disadvantage of implementing a joint camouflage uniform will be 
the money already expended on uniforms that are not selected for joint use. These funds 
will essentially become wasted taxpayer dollars, which are unpopular in political 
domains. 
3. Opportunities 
Opportunities are external conditions that may assist in achieving an objective. 
Several opportunities have become evident thus far: 
• Enhance collaboration 
• Reduced storage costs 
• Streamlined logistics 
• Joint uniform may reinforce paradigm shift 
• Establishment of a joint procurement office 
• Potential cost savings 
• Maximizing proven effectiveness across all branches 
The first opportunity is one of collaboration between the Services. Thus, far, none 
of the branches have worked with another to share the knowledge and experience gained 
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in combat camouflage. Collaboration between branches has the potential to produce the 
best camouflage pattern for all Service members in joint battle spaces.  
Reducing the number of Service-specific patterns to a single joint camouflage 
uniform would reduce storage costs within the supply chain (GAO, 2010) and streamline 
logistics promoting effective cost savings by storing one uniform pattern rather than 
multiple Service-specific patterns. Furthermore, a joint camouflage pattern would provide 
the same level of camouflage effectiveness across all branches in joint battle spaces, thus 
maximizing proven effectiveness for all warfighters.  
Implementing a joint combat uniform would result in reinforcing the military’s 
paradigm shift to inclusiveness as a whole. If the military is genuinely interested in 
pursuing a policy of equality as a whole, then the Armed Forces’ choice of uniforms 
should reflect that position. 
A further potential opportunity lies in establishing a joint uniform procurement 
office at the DOD level. This would also enhance Service collaboration by providing 
equal representation by each branch. Additionally, the implementation of a joint 
camouflage uniform would eliminate the fractured approach taken over the last 15 years 
and would result in universal performance standards for combat uniforms.  
4. Threats 
Threat factors are external and may hinder objectives. Strengths and opportunities 
are often used to avoid or mitigate risks as listed below: 
• Worldwide threats and operations 
• Service-specific uniforms may degrade joint cooperation 
• Resistance to joint uniforms from stakeholders 
A prevalent threat in this analysis is continuing or emerging international unrest. 
The DOD Armed Forces are conducting operations worldwide, in a variety of 
environments, each with differing vegetation and terrain. Many of these operations are 
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conducted jointly, and each branch may be called upon to operate in several 
environments. 
Continuation of Service-specific uniform development without collaboration may 
degrade inter-service cooperation. Moreover, this will not be beneficial in the current 
joint operating environment. In addition, as previously mentioned, there may be some 




V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSES 
To summarize the analyses of this report, the barriers to implementing a joint 
camouflage uniform are:  
• Costs of terminating Service-specific uniform contracts  
• Resistance from stakeholders 
There are two propositions at hand: maintaining the status quo of Service-specific 
uniforms, and implementing a joint camouflage uniform—or family of uniforms—for use 
by all DOD branches. The following comparative analysis will focus on the relevant 
points of each potential barrier and how these difficulties can be mitigated.  
(1) Costs of terminating Service-specific uniform contracts 
This is a two-fold category that relates to the probable cost to commercial 
providers and the potential costs to the military of terminating existing uniform contracts. 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supplies clothing to all Services through various 
agreements. The U.S. Military branches submit an order and pay a fee to DLA to procure 
their uniforms (Defense Logistics Agency, n.d.). 
According to GAO report 10–669, Defense Supply Center Philadelphia’s (DSCP) 
cost to produce and procure ground combat uniforms have increased from $223 million 
in FY05 to $422 million in FY09 (GAO, 2010). This period reflects the introduction of 
several Service-specific camouflage uniforms. There was an increase in the number of 
ACUs, ABUs, and flame-resistant uniforms issued which contributed to a spike in FY06. 




Figure 13.  Total uniform production and procurement costs by fiscal year. 
Source: GAO (2010). 
Much of this cost could be negated by implementing a joint camouflage uniform 
for all Services. GAO report 12–707 found that the Armed Forces have collectively spent 
approximately $12.5 million for uniform development since 2000 (GAO, 2012). 
Procurement of military uniforms is managed by the Defense Logistics Agency 
Troop Support (DLATS) through various commercial providers (Defense Logistics 
Agency, n.d.). The current status quo of Service-specific uniforms results in a higher 
number of contracts for production; however, a single joint camouflage uniform for all 
Services would significantly lower the number of contracts. This action may adversely 
affect commercial providers due to the reduced number of contracts needed; however, the 
DOD would benefit from the cost savings. Terminating or modifying existing contracts 
may also result in an additional financial cost to the military.  
(2) Resistance from stakeholders 
There are several stakeholders regarding uniforms in the military. Service 
members, Service leaders, politicians, and commercial providers are all affected by the 
selection of camouflage uniforms. Discontinuing the procurement of Service-specific 
uniforms in favor of a joint pattern would potentially affect commercial providers the 
greatest. There may be political and commercial resistance due to this change. There is 
likely to be resistance from certain Service Members or Service leaders as well. The 
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USMC seem to be especially proud of their MARPAT MCCUU and rightly so; they 
spent the least amount of money of any branch and produced an effective set of 
camouflage patterns that met the stated objectives of providing greater effectiveness than 
the BDU/DCU.  
If the DOD were to implement a camouflage pattern for all Services to use then 
some Service’s uniforms would conceivably not be selected. This decision may lead to 
dissatisfaction from some parties such as politicians or Service leaders. However, if the 
Army’s desire for a three-pattern family were implemented jointly, the three patterns 
could, for example, use a combination of patterns from across the Services, resulting in a 
compromise that all branches could accept. Additionally, the money saved on uniform 
procurement and streamlined logistics should more than offset any such resistance by 
way of cost savings across the DOD.  
Extensive camouflage pattern evaluations have definitively shown which patterns 
work best in a given environment. Of the approximately $12.5 million spent on uniform 
development by military branches since 2000 (GAO, 2012), the DOD has acquired three 
effective patterns. Both of the MARPAT versions have tested well, as has the Army’s 
OCP and OEF-CP. The USAF ABU, IABU, and the USN NWU Type I were not 
developed for camouflage effectiveness, but rather branch individuality. The USAF has 
been directed to use the USA’s OCP FRACU in Afghanistan, and the USN wear either 
the DCU or the new NWU Type III, which is a woodland pattern. 
If the DOD were to implement a joint camouflage uniform, or family of uniforms, 
based off testing results, then all Service Members would have the same level of 
camouflage effectiveness in joint battle spaces.  
The following section will revisit the research questions and briefly summarize 
the answers gleaned from the research. 
• What barriers hinder the DOD from implementing a single joint 
camouflage combat uniform?  
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There are two primary barriers that could affect implementation of a joint 
camouflage combat uniform; resistance from stakeholders and the cost of terminating 
Service-specific uniform contracts. 
• What are the Service histories for the camouflage combat uniform?  
Each Service began with the use of the BDU and DCU. The USMC debuted the 
first U.S. Military digital camouflage patterns followed by the USA, USAF, and USN; 
each uniform was distinct to that branch. Unfortunately, none of the Services collaborated 
on uniform development, which created duplication and additional funding for the 
separate development efforts.  
• What are the benefits and drawbacks of implementing a single joint 
camouflage combat uniform?  
The benefits include equal camouflage effectiveness across all Services, reduced 
cost of development and storage, and emphasis placed on effectiveness and performance 
instead of uniqueness. The primary drawbacks are the potential resistance from 
stakeholders and a possible change to industry providers.  
• What kind of testing is conducted for camouflage patterns?  
Testing has been conducted in the visual and non-visual spectrums, performance, 
durability, and pattern effectiveness in different environments. 
• What do the PEST and SWOT analyses provide to the development of 
acquisition strategies?  
These analyses have highlighted the lack of collaboration between Services in 
uniform procurement. Additionally, there appears to be a lack of commitment from some 
Services in following DOD acquisition guidance. And, perhaps most importantly, 
camouflage effectiveness was not among the criteria for performance standards. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There seems to be a prevailing military culture that values wearing distinctive 
camouflage uniforms, even if many of these uniforms do not provide effective 
concealment in battle spaces. This paradigm, however, has cost millions of dollars and 
complicated logistics at the DOD level. Testing has found that the Army’s OCP works 
well as a transitional pattern and that the MARPAT designs perform well in their 
intended environment.  
Logistics costs in procurement and storage would be reduced if the DOD were 
to implement a joint camouflage uniform for use by all Services. Finally, all Service 
members would have the same level of camouflage effectiveness regardless of branch. 
The U.S. military branches have employed ten different camouflage uniforms 
in the last 15 years in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operational environments. None of 
the Branches collaborated with another branch but instead used a fractured approach to 
uniform development. This methodology resulted in several unfavorable 
consequences, such as millions of dollars in extra spending, additional logistics 
requirements, compromised camouflage protection for Service members, and at least 
three uniforms that did not meet branch objectives.  
The 2014–2015 NDAA contained provisions to stop the development of 
Service-specific camouflage patterns in order to adopt a joint pattern or family of 
patterns. This author has found that there are some potential barriers to implementing 
this proposal; however, there are some recommendations that may promote such a 
transition. 
Recommendation 1: Create a joint office for uniform development and 
procurement at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level. The DOD currently 
issues guidance for acquisition practices under the DOD Directive 5000-Series. 
Initially, only the USMC followed this directive and subsequently introduced a 
uniform that met its stated objectives. The other three branches failed to follow this 
guidance, resulting in uniforms that had to be replaced. A joint uniform procurement 
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office would promote collaborative opportunities and reduced overall development 
costs. An organization along this vein has recently been created in the Joint Clothing 
and Textile Governance Board (JCTGB), which may accomplish this recommendation. 
However, it seems that this board has only met four times since 2010 and may not 
have the requisite program management expertise to develop the joint uniform (Senate 
Bill 2943, Sec. 332, 2016). 
Recommendation 2: Begin development of a three-pattern family of 
camouflage uniforms. Extensive testing and evaluation have been conducted in the 
arena of camouflage pattern effectiveness. A family of patterns including woodland, 
transitional, and arid uniforms would allow combatant commanders to operate 
efficiently in joint battle spaces. One such family could include the Army’s OCP for 
transitional environments, the Marine’s MARPAT desert pattern for arid or urban 
environments, and the Navy’s NWU Type III for woodland environments.  
Recommendation 3: Conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine OCIE pattern 
or patterns. Testing has determined that camouflage uniform effectiveness could be 
significantly increased with the addition of environment-specific OCIE. However, 
procuring multiple OCIE patterns will increase the overall cost as well as growing 
logistics requirements by requiring DLA to procure and store additional OCIE sets in 
three patterns rather than one. The DLA Troop Support Clothing and Textiles Supply 
Chain report a cost of approximately $4,000 in OCIE expenses per Soldier, although 
this number would decrease with a standard complement of boots, helmet, and 
eyewear for example (Berteau, 2011).  
Recommendation 4: Continue to pursue technological advancements in uniform 
design and production. NSRDEC reports advances in fiber science resulting in 
enhanced strength and flame resistance as well as being environmentally friendly and 
sustainable (Lafontaine, 2016). There have also been recent advances in ink jet 
printing that could result in environment-specific patterns being produced—in small 
quantities—in a matter of hours instead of the weeks or months it has traditionally 
taken (ROTHTEC, n.d.). 
 43 
Lastly, the prevailing military culture of utilizing distinctive camouflage 
uniforms does not reflect the current changing paradigm shift from exclusiveness to 
inclusiveness. Recent policies and practices that emphasize inclusion are perhaps 
degraded by distinctive uniform wear. Our Service members deserve the most effective 
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